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1. Introduction
Policy formulation in federal states rarely is a one-level activity. It usually includes actors 
from the federal as well as the sub-state level. The reasons for this can be twofold: 
either there are constitutional requirements for co-decision-making or the actors 
voluntarily work together to avoid or reduce incoherency, redundancies or negative 
externalities caused by their policies. The German federal state is an example where 
multilevel coordination in policy formulation is a constitutional requirement as well as a 
voluntary activity. Through the German Bundesrat, the sub-states have co-decision 
rights in federal policy-making. Additionally, there are many informal coordination 
activities between the sub-states, for example in the ministerial conferences.
This coordination is especially prom inent when it comes to EU policy-making, where it 
has coined the expression of the “German Vote” (e.g. Moore and Eppler, 2008: 498; 
Schlitz, 2010) as a saying for the late positioning of Germany for negotiations in the 
EU’s Council of Ministers. Literature has identified two reasons for this delay. First, the 
constitutional principle of departmentalism gives responsibility and autonomy to every 
minister for his/her own portfolio (Article 65 Basic Law; Fleischer, 2011a). This leads to a 
high sectoralization of policy-making in general. For EU policy in particular, 
competences are shared and expertise is distributed between different ministries on the 
federal level, namely the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of 
Finances (Bauer et al., 2007; Derlien, 2000; Moore and Eppler, 2008). Secondly, due to 
the federal structure, the Länder are involved in EU policy-making. W ith the incremental 
extensions of their participation rights over the last decades and especially since the 
introduction of the Article 23 Basic Law (Europaartikel) (Calliess, 2000; Große 
Hüttmann, 2010; Jeffery, 1996) the Länder through the Bundesrat are important actors 
in domestic European policy coordination. Additionally, the Länder have installed their 
own offices and Representations in Brussels. Hence, the coordination of German EU 
policy is inherently complex and involves a multitude of actors at two levels of 
government.
This paper will build on these findings and extend them by looking into the process of 
German EU policy coordination at the sub-state level. Here we find 16 governments 
consisting of several departments which develop their own ideas, interests and 
preferences about EU policy. In order to be able to get heard at the federal level and to 
influence the German position in EU decision-making, the sub-states cannot act 
individually but need to form alliances amongst each other. This paper will look into the 
process of coordination between the sub-states themselves and with the federal level. It 
wants to answer the question how German EU policy coordination is organized and 
conducted at the sub-state level. W hich strategies for building alliances to influence the 
German position are taken by the actors?
To answer this question, the theoretical and analytical perspective of the paper will be 
described (2.1.). The term coordination is used in literature in many different contexts; 
hence a context-specific definition is needed. This paper will thoroughly conceptualize 
coordination as a process with different dimensions (chapter 2.2), also indicating the 
definition’s potential for generalization. Empirically, the process of German EU policy 
coordination at the sub-state level will be investigated in detail using data from expert 
interviews with ministerial bureaucrats (chapter 3 and 4). Chapter 5 will elaborate on the 
strategy of reducing complexity during the coordination process.
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2. Conceptual Framework
Conceptually, the argument builds on an Actor-Centered Institutionalism argument in 
combination with a thorough definition and operationalization of coordination as a 
process.
2.1 Theoretical framework
The argument put forward here is a rational choice institutionalism argument, in 
particular the Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI) as introduced by Renate Mayntz and 
Fritz Scharpf (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997). This framework explains 
political decisions as results of strategies of goal-oriented actors who act in an 
institutional context which, in turn, influences their strategies (Scharpf, 1997: 43-49). 
Therefore, institutions can empower or constrain certain strategies. Decisions in this 
framework can be explained by considering the actors, their constellations as well as 
their forms of interaction (Figure 1).
F igu re  1: E xp la n a to ry  F ra m e w o rk  o f A C I
Source: Scharpf (2011: 221). The political environment was deliberately left out from the original 
depiction because it is not part of the analysis.
The focus of this paper is on the aspect of “constellations” within the ACI framework. 
W hat is jus t described as “constellations” is in fact a multitude of different constellations 
in which the actors meet during the process of coordination. Literature on horizontal 
federalism and intergovernmental relations points to the fact that “the” sub-states need 
to be considered not only as one corporate actor as opposed to the federal level, but 
that each sub-state has its own interests and preferences (Nugent, 2009; Simeon,
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2006). W ithin the different actor constellations, different interests and preferences, 
shared by the meeting actors, are expected to dominate at different points of time during 
the coordination process. The coordination process is mostly dominated by executive 
actors, the governments and their administrations of the federal state and the sub-states 
(Johns et al., 2007; Watts, 1989). The actors analyzed here are the departments of the 
sub-states and the federal state. They are conceptualized as corporate actors (Mayntz 
and Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 2006) emphasizing that even if decisions are in the end 
articulated by a single actor, they represent their organizational, in contrast to personal, 
preferences. However, one and the same actor can take on diverse roles, for example a 
minister is at the same time a party member, a deputy of his Land and of his sector. 
Hence, he has at the same time interests related to his political party, his constituency 
and his sector. During the process of coordination, it is hypothesizes, these interests will 
lead to meetings in different constellations.
H1: During the German EU coordination process, different actor constellations form 
according to the actors’ interests and preferences.
2.2 Defining Coordination as a process
To analyze coordination, the term needs to be defined first. Here, a process definition of 
coordination will be used and different dimensions of the coordination process will be 
elaborated. Coordination is an often used term which has many definitions. Coordination 
can be defined as an outcome of a process or as the process itself (Peters, 2013). 
Coordination as an outcome according to Peters (1998: 296) is an ‘end-state in which 
the policies and programs of government are characterized by minimal redundancy, 
incoherence and lacunae” . By using this definition, nothing is yet said about how 
coordination is achieved, which ‘strategies and instruments governments use to 
coordinate’ (Bouckaert et al., 2010: 16), which is the core of defining coordination as a 
process. This involves analyzing ‘the development of ideas about jo in t and holistic 
working, jo in t information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, 
and making decisions” (Six, 2004: 106) and sees coordination not as an ‘end-state’, but 
as different steps on the way to an ‘end-state’. Coordination as process refers to the 
‘intervening stage of debate and deliberation” (Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997: 44) before 
the actual decision is taken, including also non-decision. By focusing on the process of 
how a decision comes about, the black-box of decision-making is opened, hence 
contributing to a better understanding and ultimately explanation of decisions. Thus 
coordination will here be defined as a process, involving different stages, in which actors 
prepare a collective decision.
In order to operationalize these stages of coordination, a three step scale is developed 
consisting of information, positioning and negotiation1. A t the step of information actors 
communicate with each other and inform each other about their preferences and 
interests on a certain issue. At this point, no change in behavior of any one actor takes 
place. A t the step of positioning actors position themselves towards other actors. This 
can involve delineation towards actors that were identified to have opposite preferences. 
It can however also involve inclusion in a sense that actors were identified to have 
sim ilar positions and decide to work together to come up with a coherent opinion on an 
issue. A t the third step of negotiation actors try to negotiate agreement according to the
1 These steps are derived from the nine-step coordination scale by Metcalfe (1994) and the 
expert interviews.
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decision rule. These different steps along the process of coordination can be carried out 
by different actors in different constellations.
Coordination can take place at different points of time during the policy cycle. In the 
agenda-setting phase actors can jointly decide to bring a topic to the agenda. Especially 
in policy formulation actors coordinate the formulation of a policy to be ratified. In the 
implementation phase actors can decide on whether and how to work together when 
implementing a policy. In contrast to coordinating the decision to jo intly implement, the 
actual realization of the implementation will be called cooperation. Cooperation means 
that actors actually do what was agreed on or what is in the best interest of the group of 
actors as a whole, despite the fact that another behavior might put themselves 
individually in a better position (Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997: 197). Thus cooperation 
can follow coordination or it can emerge as "more temporary and informal” (Bouckaert et 
al., 2010: 17).
In a federal political system, such as the German Federal Republic, coordination can 
take place in various directions: there can be vertical coordination between the federal 
state and the sub-state level, horizontal coordination between the sub-state units 
themselves, or intra-constituency coordination only including the departments form one 
sub-state2. Intra-constituency coordination in Germany is at least as important as 
vertical and horizontal coordination because of the strong sectoral ministers due to the 
departmental principle, de jure (Article 65 Basic Law) and de facto (Fleischer, 2011a). 
Finally, the basic cause of coordination can either be voluntary or coerced (Hegele and 
Behnke, 2013: 26f.; Peters, 2013: 573). Coerced coordination refers to a coordination 
process where the agreement of all actors is necessary for a decision to be agreed on. 
This kind of coordination process usually occurs as prescribed by the constitution, 
secondary law or in a strictly hierarchical setting. An example of a coerced coordination 
process is jo in t decision-making (Scharpf et al., 1976), where the actors need to agree 
on a jo in t decision or the status quo will be uphold. A voluntary coordination process in 
contrast does not require the actors to participate, the process is not legally prescribed 
and there are multiple exit-options for the actors. Table 1 summarizes the different 
dimensions of the coordination process.
2 The usage of these terms is leaned on multilevel governance and federalism research. In public 
administration research, horizontal and vertical coordination are used slightly differently. 
Especially vertical coordination as used here does not come with the notion of hierarchy (e.g. 
Bouckaert et al., 2010: 23f.).
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Time point of coordination Agenda-Setting
(in the policy cycle) Policy Formulation
Implementation
Direction of Coordination Intra-constituency
Horizontal
Vertical
Stages of Coordination Information
Positioning
Negotiation
Cause of Coordination Voluntary
Coerced
To understand the process of coordination of EU policy between the German sub-states 
and the strategies they use, all dimensions of the coordination process need to be 
considered. Because these dimensions are too manifold to be treated in one 
constellation, it will be secondly hypothesized that:
H2: During the German EU coordination process, different actor constellations are 
concerned with different dimension of the coordination process.
3. The sub-state actors in EU policy coordination
This chapter will describe the sub-state actors and their involvement in EU policy before 
the next chapter will analyze the actor constellations and the dimensions of 
coordination. The task of coordination in the German federal state is regularly attributed
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to the government chancelleries, namely the federal chancellery (Bornemann, 2011; 
Fleischer, 2011b; Müller-Rommel, 2011) and the Permanent Representation in Brussels 
(Kassim and Peters, 2003), the state and senate chancelleries of the Länder (Häußer, 
1995; Zerr, 2006) and the Länder Representations in Berlin (Laufer and Wirth, 1974; 
Schrenk, 2010) and Brussels (Zumschlinge, 1999). The government chancelleries 
(Regierungszentralen) are the administrative body of the head of government 
(chancellor or prime minister) (Häußer, 1995; Zerr, 2006). They have installed ‘mirror 
units’ which mirror the departments of the government; e.g. for each ministry in the Land 
there is a section in the government chancellery which is responsible for the contact to 
this ministry (see Figure 2 ). These mirror units in the government chancelleries are 
primarily concerned with coordinating Land issues. In order to deal with federal and 
European issues, the Länder have installed Land Representations in Berlin and 
Brussels. The Länder Representations in Berlin are essentially responsible for 
coordination in the course of the Bundesrat (Schrenk, 2010), whereas the Länder 
Representations in Brussels deal with European issues (Kropp, 2010; Zumschlinge, 
1999: 174ff.). The Land ministries, as sectoral experts, additionally established 
organizational units for European relations within their ministries. For an overview of all 
actors involved in the process see Figure 2. The next section will analyze in which 
constellations the actors meet during the process of coordination and which dimensions 
of the coordination process are apparent in these constellations.
F igu re  2: A c to rs  invo lved  in  E U  po licy  coord ina tion
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4. Empirical analysis
The following analysis is a case study of the process of coordination in a federal system. 
The case of Germany is chosen as an extreme case. The policy field of EU policy 
formulation is chosen because first, the German sub-states have strong incentives to try 
to influence the German federal government when it comes to EU decisions because 
they are affected by the decisions w ithout a formal vote. Second, its inherently cross- 
sectoral nature makes EU coordination especially interesting because it usually involves 
at least one additional policy sector. Due to the strong role of sub-state units and the 
strong principle of departmentalism in Germany, the case combines problems of 
handling coordination across federal units and across policy sectors. Selecting an 
extreme case for a case study is valuable for exploratory purposes (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008) and to highlight the extreme phenomenon which could otherwise be 
hidden by other phenomena. The aim of this study is to further develop the concept of 
coordination, to understand the structure of the coordination process and analyze the 
strategies the actors use.
The main primary data are derived from 14 semi-structured expert interviews with civil 
servants in the government chancelleries, including the Länder Representations in 
Berlin and Brussels, and Land ministries (Table 2 ). The interviews were mostly recorded, 
transcribed and coded according to the different dimensions of coordination. For the 
section on the m inister’s conferences, a dataset on four m inister’s conferences was 
used as a complement (for a description of the dataset see Hegele and Behnke, 2013). 
The following sections empirically analyze the actor constellations during the process of 
EU policy coordination in Germany. It will roughly follow the coordination process 
chronologically, starting with the beginning of the European policy process in Brussels, 
moving to the coordination process at the sub-state level within Germany and finishing 
with the decision of the Bundesrat.
Table  2: O rg an iza tiona l A f f i l ia t io n  o f In terview ees
Organization of the Interviewee Number of
Interviewees
Government chancellery of the Länder 4 (3 esp. EU)
Länder Representation in Berlin 3 (1 esp. EU)
Länder Representation in Brussels 3
Federal Chancellery 1
Land Ministries 3
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4.1 Land Representations in Brussels
First, the Brussels Land Representations are involved in the coordination process on­
site in Brussels. They observe and contact the European institutions in Brussels 
directly3. They work according to the principle of mirror units, meaning that one of the 
bureaucrats in the Brussels Representation is responsible for communication and 
coordination with one or more of the Land ministries. Thus in the first coordination 
constellation, the officials in the Brussels Representations meet or contact their home 
ministries. In this constellation, sectoral interests will prevail because bureaucrats 
exchange their expert knowledge. According to the interviews, one of the main tasks of 
the Länder Representations in Brussels is information. They know the position of the 
European institutions, filter the relevant information for their ministry and develop expert 
knowledge on European matters which they can bring into the domestic policy process. 
One of the interviewees put it this way: “we need to hear the grass growing and how it is 
growing at the earliest time possible” (Interview 8, own translation). The government 
chancellery and the ministries can contact “their” m irror section in order to receive 
information on the state of the debate at the European level. In this constellation, the 
coordination process is dominated by sectoral interests, intra-constituency, at the stage 
of information and voluntary (Interviews 3, 8, 9 and 10).
Second, the officials of the Brussels Representations of all the Länder meet regularly in 
working groups, according to their sectoral affiliation. They share information and 
position themselves in the issues discussed. A deputy of the Permanent Representation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany also participates. This stage of the coordination 
process thus is horizontal or vertical, still voluntary and circulates around sectoral 
interests (Interview 8, 10).
All in all, the Brussels Representations are important actors when it comes to collecting 
information and especially work according to a sectoral principle, either within each 
Land or horizontally and vertically. No important party political meetings in Brussels have 
been reported in the Interviews (8, 9 and 10) and cross-sectoral coordination within the 
constituency seems to mainly take place between the institutions located ‘at home’ 
(government chancellery and ministries).
4.2 Ministerial conferences
Ministerial conferences are meetings of the sub-state ministers according to their 
sectoral affiliation. There are 18 sectoral conferences and the Prime Ministers’ 
Conference (PMC). The conferences usually discuss issues before they enter the 
Bundesrat agenda. One of the conferences is dedicated to European affairs, the 
European Ministers’ Conference (Europaministerkonferenz, EMC) which was founded in 
1992, meets three times a year and has two working groups, the “permanent working 
group of the EMC” which prepares the EMC plenary session and the working group 
“European communication” which coordinates the European public relations of the 
Länder. The activity of the EMC however is rare and limited, it is rather the sectoral 
ministerial conferences which deal with European issues in their respective sphere of 
competence (also Schmuck, 2009: 494). Considering the resolutions of the ministerial 
conferences of agriculture, environment, infrastructure and transportation (Hegele and
3 Of course, the Brussels Representations also form coordination constellations with the EU 
institutions, which will not be discussed here because this paper focuses on EU policy 
coordination within Germany.
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Behnke, 2013) shows the importance of the other sectoral conferences for the 
coordination of European policies. From the total number of 634 analyzed resolutions of 
the four conferences during 2006-2010, 81 concern European issues (13%). Most of 
these are discussed in the conference of the ministers for agriculture and the 
conference of the ministers for environment. This is not surprising as these policy fields 
are much more Europeanized than infrastructure and transportation (Table 3). The 
sectoral ministerial conferences hence play a bigger role in coordinating EU policy than 
the EMC and it was reported that the share of EU related topics is still increasing. These 
actor constellations are also oriented on sectoral interests. The aim of these voluntary 
conferences is information exchange between the Länder and with the federal level. 
Additionally, the Länder often ask the federal level to advocate certain Länder interests 
on the EU level. The ministerial conferences very often become active to support the 
sectoral concerns and by signing a political resolution in which they often support the 
respective federal ministry in its sectoral point of view, which might otherwise get lost 
during Bundesrat process or on the expense of other sectoral or the constituency 
interests (Interview 8, 13, 14).
Table  3: N um ber o f issues discussed in  the conferences
All issues European issues % of European in all issues
Agriculture 264 61 23%
Environment 189 11 6%
Infrastructure 39 3 8%
Transportation 142 6 4%
Total 634 81 13%
On top, the Prime M inister’s Conference (PMC) is hierarchically superior to the 
ministerial conferences because it is the meeting of the heads of government of the 
Länder. In this constellation the most important topics are discussed horizontally 
between the Länder and sometimes also vertically with the federal level. These are 
either topics which are of high salience at the moment or with which several sectoral 
conferences were concerned and did not find agreement. This actor constellation is also 
voluntary and serves information exchange and positioning of the actors (Interview 14)4. 
Before the conferences, pre-conferences are held by the actors according to their party 
political affiliations. The two big opposing camps, Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats as well as in the last years the Greens, meet separately to discuss the 
issues from a party political point of view. In cases where the federal government
4 See also http://www.thueringen.de/th1/mpk/themen/europa/, 26.04.2016.
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belongs to the respective party fam ily the federal ministry participates as well. In this 
voluntary coordination constellation, the sub-states exchange information and try to 
position themselves together as a party fam ily (Interview 13, 14). In some sectors, the 
vertical coordination on EU topics takes place specifically according to this logic as well. 
One interviewee reported that the federal ministry meets with representatives from the 
sectoral conference, one from each party family, and discusses salient EU policies with 
them. These representatives hence need to know the position of their party political 
peers in order to ensure that their interests are taken into account (Interview 12).
To sum up, the ministerial conferences are voluntary actor constellations which are 
mainly involved in German EU policy coordination according to a sectoral division. They 
normally discuss issues before they enter the Bundesrat agenda and serve the 
exchange of information and positioning. Their mode of interaction is consensual and 
real negotiation between the actors only takes place at later stages, in the cabinets and 
the Bundesrat.
4.3 Länder cabinets
In EU matters, each Land finally needs to vote in the Bundesrat (see next section). The 
decision on how to vote needs to be agreed on in cabinet. Most Länder cabinets try to 
find consensus and otherwise cast a vote of abstention. Due to the sectoral orientation 
of the information collection and first positioning, intra-constituency coordination 
between the sectoral interests is needed to come to a cabinet decision which is oriented 
on the interest of the constituency as a whole. This represents another actor 
constellation in which either officials form different departments, state secretaries or the 
ministers themselves meet. The government chancellery is attributed a general 
coordination task due to the guideline principle associated with the office of the prime 
minister (Basic Law, Article 65). Additionally, in most Länder European Affairs as a topic 
is located in the government chancelleries as well. For this reason, the sectoral 
ministerial conferences as well as the Bundesrat committees report back to the 
coordination unit in the government chancelleries (Interview 12). A t this step of the 
coordination process, constituency interests prevail. The members of government 
position themselves and negotiate in order to agree on a Bundesrat vote; coordination 
hence is coerced (Interview 1, 3, 4, 6, 7).
4.4 The Bundesrat
Article 23 Basic Law makes the Bundesrat an actor in German EU policy coordination. 
The Länder through the Bundesrat possess information and participation rights; take on 
a veto-player role in areas of Länder competence by directly participating in EU 
decision-making; have installed a Länder observer at the Council of Ministers; need to 
agree to further transfers of sovereignty with a two-thirds majority and have introduced a 
"European Chamber” in the Bundesrat (Moore and Eppler, 2008). Additionally, the 
Bundesrat is involved in German policy-making carrying out EU regulations through the 
regular co-decision rights. The Bundesrat is composed of members of government from 
the sixteen sub-states directly. Every Land has a certain number of votes ranging from 
three to six, as a function of their number of inhabitants. Votes need to be cast en bloc 
by the Land (Article 51 Basic Law). Decisions in the Bundesrat plenum are taken by
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absolute majority of votes (Article 52 Basic Law). Before however a final Bundesrat vote 
can be taken, the actors meet in different constellations to coordinate this final decision. 
First, during the first week of the institutionalized three week sequence of the Bundesrat, 
the Bundesrat committees meet according to policy sectors (c.f. Schrenk, 2010). In this 
actor constellation clearly sectoral interests prevail. The actors exchange information 
and position themselves toward each other. A t this point, the federal level is involved, 
hence the coordination process becomes vertical, but is still voluntary. There are sixteen 
sectoral Bundesrat committees5, mostly staffed by bureaucrats from the ministries or the 
government chancelleries (Sturm and Müller, 2013: 146-148). For European issues, the 
Bundesrat has installed a committee for issues of the European Union’ (Ausschus für 
Fragen der Europäischen Union). The members of this EU committee are the last to 
meet and thus know how the other departments of their Land have voted in the other 
committees and can decide whether they agree or cast a different vote (Interview 3, 4, 
6).
Due to the majority decision of the Bundesrat, the Länder need to take into account the 
positions of the other Länder as well. Hence, in the next actor constellations, deputies of 
the different Länder meet. This step of the coordination process is carried out by the 
Berlin Länder Representations which are called by one interviewee "the on-site troop” 
(Interview 7) because they can meet with each other and also the federal level directly. 
A t this stage of the coordination process constituency interests prevail. In this voluntary 
actor constellation, information, positioning and also negotiation between the sub-states 
and with the federal state take place (Interview 4, 6, 7).
Right before the Bundesrat plenary session, the Länder meet according to their party 
political affiliations. There are meetings of the Social Democrats, the Christian 
Democrats and the Greens (c.f. Leonardy, 2002). In these meetings, which are voluntary 
and vertical if the federal government is a member of the respective political party, party 
political interests prevail and the actors try to position themselves as party members 
towards the issues discussed (Interview 4, 6). The last and decisive actor constellation 
is the Bundesrat plenary as such which is coercive in nature, involves all Länder and the 
federal level. Even though the federal state is not a formal member with voting right, it 
participates in the meetings and discussions as an observer and a guest in order to 
ensure vertical coordination. Here, last positioning and negotiation takes place and 
sectoral, party political and constituency interest are integrated (Interview 4, 5).
Table  4  summarizes the different constellations and dimensions of the coordination 
process they cover.
5 The committees roughly correspond to the departmental organization at the federal level but are 
stable and not subject to changes in the departmental organization (Sturm and Müller, 2013).
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Table  4: A c to r  C onste lla tions and D im ensions o f C o o rd ina tio n
Constellation Actors’Interests Direction Stages Causes
Brussels mirror 







Brussels Sectoral Horizontal, Information,
voluntaryRepresentations interests Vertical positioning
ministerial pre­ Party political Horizontal, Information,
voluntaryconferences interests Vertical positioning
Ministerial Sectoral Horizontal, Information,









chancellery and Constituency Intra- Positioning,
coercedLand ministry/ interests constituency negotiation
cabinet
Bundesrat Sectoral Horizontal, Information,























5. Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical analysis of the German coordination process of EU policy-making 
supports the two hypotheses. The actors meet in different constellations during the 
process of coordination and focus on different actors’ interests in different meetings. 
Additionally, the further dimensions of coordination also vary during the process. This 
reveals a certain strategic pattern. First of all, the process is institutionally and
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chronologically divided between the Länder Representations in Brussels, the ministerial 
conferences, the government chancelleries, the Länder Representations in Berlin and 
the Bundesrat. These all represent different constellations in which the relevant actors 
meet. The sub-states try to use these meetings to influence the German position on EU 
policies. This influence is possible because the sub-states are legally involved by the 
constitution to participate in EU policy-making but also because they possess expert 
knowledge on certain topics, especially on the implementation of policies which is mainly 
carried out by the sub-states in the German federal system.
During the process of coordination, a certain pattern of how the actor constellations 
follow each other can be detected. There are two actor constellations where a jo int 
decision is necessary, hence coordination is coerced. However, in the cabinet as well as 
in the Bundesrat decisions can be taken by majority. For this reason, these two actor 
constellations are preceded by several voluntary meetings. When an issue first comes 
up, it is ideally picked up by the Länder Representations in Brussels and first 
coordination meetings around sectoral interests, within the own constituency and 
together with other constituencies takes place. When moved to the actor constellations 
within Germany, party political interests are also considered. Up to the point before the 
constituency needs to decide on its position, information exchange and positioning has 
taken place around all actor interests and directions of coordination. When a topic then 
enters the Bundesrat agenda, where a jo in t decision under majority rule needs to be 
taken in the end, another round of meetings dominated by sectoral, constituency and 
party political interests takes place, this time the actors enter negotiations.
Of course the chronology of this process is only simplified and in reality the order of the 
meetings where a certain issue is discussed can vary. But the merit of this approach is 
clearly that it reveals the underlying strategy the actors take. Because they know that in 
the end a majority decision could be taken by the Bundesrat, they organized voluntary 
coordination meetings in different actor constellations where they can disaggregate the 
different dimensions of the coordination process. If agreement is reached at an early 
stage of the coordination process only through information exchange or positioning, the 
topic will normally be considered to be solved and not be picked up at later stages. 
Hence, these meetings in several actor constellations help to procedurally reduce the 
complexity of the coordination process as a whole and at the same time promote 
consensual decision-making where possible.
This analysis hopes to contribute to research in two ways. First, a definition of 
coordination as a process has been put forward and operationalized for empirical 
investigation. The dimensions elaborated for the procedural definition of coordination 
can also be applied to other contexts, processes, policy fields or states; it might even 
serve as an analytic framework for international comparison. Secondly, it has been 
shown empirically that the complexity of decision-making, which is ubiquitous in today’s 
intertwined and networked world, can be reduced procedurally in spite of, or maybe 
even because, multiple actors are involved.
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